WTO Ascension Controversy: The Case of the Bahamas

by Kreimild Saunders

© 2019

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Kreimild is  an Assistant Professor of  Sociology at the University of The Bahamas. She has been a long time advocate of social equality--gender, race-ethnicity, global, class and sexuality.

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Summary: In the ‘developing’ world WTO ascension has been a contentious undertaking, the Bahamas is no different in this regard. This essay highlights the ascension goals of the Minnis administration and the reaction to them. It briefly discusses the literature on WTO ascension and growth and the Oxford Economics report on ascension models for negotiation. Furthermore, it problematizes the neo-liberal, WTO+ agenda and advocates that the state seeks alternative strategies to strengthen the economy, lower unemployment, reduce socio-economic inequality and reinforce the social safety-net as a survival strategy for a small, dependent, vulnerable island state under global capitalism rather than ascension.

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Beware: you can have a seat at the table and be on the menu

Sir Ronald Sanders, former ambassador to Antigua and Barbuda, lead World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiator in Antigua and Barbuda’s dispute against the USA on cross border gambling and betting services, current ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the USA and the OAS, was the guest speaker on Z Live on April 29, 2019 about the benefits of WTO ascension for the Bahamas--argumentum ad verecundiam[i].

Talk radio in the Bahamas is a powerful medium through which to appeal to an authority figure such as Sir Sanders. What stands out in Sanders’ commentary is the striking alimentary trope “better to have a seat at the table than be on the menu”.[ii] He states that WTO membership enables members, particularly less powerful ones to contribute to the legal framework and regulatory arrangements of WTO. However, this trope is remarkable because it represents those who sit at the table as empowered players on one of the most powerful economic platforms in the world. They are denoted as the fittest players, players that are change agents, while outsiders are marked as objects of consumption.

Z. Laing is the talk show host on Z Live and lead negotiator for the Bahamas in the ascension process. [iii]  He pointed to the failure of Antigua and Barbuda to find a satisfactory resolution to the longstanding case against the US, on cross border betting and gambling, as one reason put forth against WTO ascension.[iv] Sir Sanders acknowledged flaws in the dispute settlement process but remained resolute in his commitment to the value of full WTO membership. The case is exceptional because a small island state was able to win a case against the USA in WTO’s dispute settlement process.  The overview of this case is instructive to evaluate Sir Sanders’ fundamental premise, one that he provides no support for. What he offers is an empty rhetorical trope, an opportunity to dine on wishful thinking.[v]

In 2003 Antigua requested that the dispute resolution body (DRB) arrange a consultation with the US on the obstruction of cross-border gambling and betting services.  In 2004 the DRB initially issued an interim report and subsequently a final report that surprisingly concluded that the US had indeed violated its WTO commitments in this regard. The dramatic increase in cross-border betting houses by Antigua and Barbuda from 20 in 1997 to 3000 in 1999, resulted in warnings against financial transactions by the US and the UK due to purported money laundering.  The counter measures against cross-border gambling and betting by the US reduced the number of such establishments on the islands to 119.[vi]

During the initial consultation, the US team maintained that Antigua did not demonstrate that actions on the part of the US prohibited market access or equal national treatment. It argued that Antigua simply listed the relevant General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provisions and the conflicting US laws. However, in 2005 the Appellate Board concluded that the measures banning cross-border gambling and betting was a violation of its GATS commitment to provide market access to other recreational services which included gambling; adding further that the claims to protect public morality were not justified given the differential treatment (national) in respect to interstate horse racing.[vii]

In 2017 the USA amended its GATS provisions to exclude gambling and betting services, settling all other disputes except Antigua who sought 3.4 billion dollars annually. The arbitration board limited the claims of Antigua to 21 million per year, the equivalent of cross-border horse racing services that could not be recovered.

Given that that the US and Antigua could not come to an agreement, Antigua could extract concession within the same sector where violations occurred, or if this was not practical another one.  It was not practical for Antigua to seek compensation through imposing tariffs because it would negatively impact its citizenry.  Therefore, Antigua sought to retaliated under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), but the difficulties were considerable, entailing limiting compensation to the amount allotted through arbitration, impacting rights holders and non-US citizens.[viii]  Hence, Antigua has found itself in the unenviable position of winning a case against the most power nation in the world, but unable to reap compensation. The Appellate Body (AB) cannot enforce financial compensation, so Antigua remained at the mercy of the USA. It is not surprising that the US offered a meager compensation of about two million dollars, a compelling show of force.[ix]  This was the elephant that was circumvented in this discourse on ascension.  The rules are stacked in favor of powerful nations not small island states.  Sitting at the table did not prevent Antigua from being eaten. [x]

WTO is a legal framework for international trade. However, there are the official rules and there are other regulatory norms that are in tension with these rules. This tension is manifested around special differential treatment (SDT) permanently enabled under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1975 which allows developing countries preferential access to markets. SDT has been regularized for the least developed countries (LDC).

Small island developing states (SIDS) have been lobbying to be recognized as a special category like the LDC. This is because they are disadvantaged by remoteness, smallness which does not permit economies of scale, high fuel and transportation costs, relatively high tariffs and susceptibility to hurricanes that together represent significant competitive handicaps. These challenges tend to erase any potential competitive advantage, reducing it to near zero. The most significant resistance of Bahamian entrepreneurs to WTO ascension has been around this self-evident, absolute disadvantage vis-à-vis global players in the market. Thus, the prevailing outcry has been “what are we getting out of this”. [xi]

The ascension process entails a working party that negotiates with the acceding state on commitments. Subsequently, ascension is ratified by the whole WTO body. The current norms differ from those that existed for the founding members who were entitled to SDT. Even LDC are not legally entitled to SDT, rather they are more likely to be given consideration. In addition, at each successive round of negotiation after ascension the SDT granted for a transition period would have to be re-negotiated. Ascenders are expected to specialize in goods they can export competitively and import other products at lower prices than the pre-ascension period (entailing tariff reductions or no subsidies on local products). The current norms of ascension demand that ascending developing countries, including LDC make commitments beyond what is required (WTO-Plus) ostensibly because of the ideal of a level playing field. According to this false ideology every member state operates according to the same rules. The underlying assumption is that preferential treatment distorts the global trading system. [xii]

However, WTO rules allow a working party member who had entered bilateral negotiations to opt out (ex-post non-application) which strengthens the hand of members over ascenders. Hence, WTO operates like a fraternity where neophytes are often subjected to excessive, neo-liberal discipline in order to become members. This entails the extraction of large commitments in line with neoliberalism. Acceding states at the lower end of the international hierarchy pay a heavy price to have a seat at the proverbial table, under the delusion that they are in for fine dining.  I made this detour in order to show that the WTO is not a democratic but a hierarchical order. As the Antiguan case clearly shows the level playing field is not an ideal it is a neoliberal myth.  

The limited literature on WTO ascension and economic growth is contentious.  One study argued that there was a tendency for an increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rates for five years after ascension but this was contingent on enacting binding neoliberal practices such as tariff reduction, ‘fair competition’ reduction in restrictions on payment and foreign-exchange, protection of intellectual property rights, termination of state monopolies and subsidies,  transparent policy making and so on. This growth does not hold beyond five years. (M. Tang and S. Wei 2008). Growth was also thought to be contingent on other factors such as comparative advantage and resource endowment (A. Bernier and J. Schlandt 2018). Given the paucity of research and the inherent challenges of doing cross-country econometric studies, the validity and reliability of studies on this issue is a question mark.[xiii]

Oxford economics studied the impact of WTO ascension on the Bahamas. This entailed a consultation with key stakeholders, an economic and a regulatory profile, and a modelling of two policy scenarios of ascension—limited (based on current offers) and comprehensive reforms that outline a prognosis for GDP growth (including sector effects), fiscal deficit and employment growth. The prognosis for GDP growth for the limited policy was slightly negative in the short term but 0.8% higher growth by 2029.  The comprehensive model forecasted GDP growth as 5.7% higher by 2029. The presentation of the methodological underpinnings of the modelling was very scant. As aforementioned, the validity and reliability of econometric studies on nations that have ascended is questionable and forecasting is even more speculative. Unfortunately, Oxford economics did not give a methodological analysis in their report, only brief summary remarks.[xiv]  

The 2018 statutory tariff rate is 34% but the effective rate is estimated to be 10% for agricultural goods and 11% for non-agricultural goods. The latter is a consequence of exemptions and concessions.[xv]  A reduction in tariffs is regarded as crucial to WTO ascension.[xvi]

There has also been a significant relaxation of exchange controls. In 2018 the Central Bank of the Bahamas introduced measures to reduce the requirements for approval for international capital and current account transactions to facilitate cross-border transactions. Various anti-money laundering and counter terrorism legislation and measures have been introduced to support the integrity of the banking system.[xvii]

In 2015 the Bahamas government introduced new laws to strengthen intellectual property rights in a move towards compliance with WTO’s TRIPS agreements. These laws cover trademarks, patents, copyrights, new plant varieties among others. The state has also introduced the fair competition act to prohibit anti-competitive, unfair and misleading trading practices, the Commercial Enterprise Act and a new BH-1B visas for foreigners with special skills.[xviii]

The commitment to the sale of state monopolies is evident in the sale of Bahamas Telecommunications Corporation and the introduction of ALIVE and Cable Bahamas as competitors. The state, particularly the Free National Movement administrations have long sought to relinquish state-owned corporations and downsize state enterprises (e.g. ZNS). The Minnis administration bought the Grand Lucayan hotel this year and announced its intention to sell it immediately. It is currently in negotiations to do so. The FNM has historically shown a greater commitment to neoliberalism than the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP)[xix]

As shown, much of the WTO’s binding neoliberal practices are being incorporated within the Bahamian context. It is important that our state and elected officials understand that neoliberalism is an ideology that is predicated on assumptions about parameters for economic growth and prosperity under capitalism. However, these entail a profit maximization strategy of big global capitalists. It reinforces the global international hierarchy between developed and so-called developing countries and does not support the development of the latter.

The challenge of successive political administrations in the Bahamas is how to chart a survival strategy for a very small, island state operating within a repressive, global capitalist environment.

In a discussion of WTO on the ZNS program A Closer Look (May,16 2019), Bent Symonette, the Minister of Finance, associated WTO ascension with the goal of transforming the current economic model that focuses on tourism and banking, a model that is viewed as outdated. He did not present a vision of a new economic model, merely an imperative for one. An actual vision requires an engagement with local business and the Bahamian people to chart the way forward. Foreign investors are interested in maximizing profits, not developing nor promoting the well-being of the Bahamas. A comprehensive approach to ascension is not the path to greater self-determination.  Therefore, WTO cannot stand in for such a vision. A concrete strategic plan is necessary to encourage and navigate new possibilities for greater social well-being.[xx]

 The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the discourse on the WTO ascension process, Oxford Economics, Central Bank officials, local business leaders and others have identified and discussed glaring weaknesses within the Bahamian economy such as low economic growth, high fiscal deficits (60.49% debt to GDP ratio in 2019), the need to balance the relaxation of exchange control with safeguards against global financial volatility, valorization debates (pegging the Bahamian to the US dollar (and the need for 50% US reserves) versus a floating Bahamian dollar or US dollarization), low bank lending, the need to cut state bureaucracy to facilitate the ease of doing business, high unemployment (2009:14.25%, 2013:16.18%  and 2017: 12.57%) over the last decade, rising illegal immigration, high VAT (2019:12%), regressive taxation and the need to move to progressive taxation (e.g. income and corporate taxation) to lower fiscal deficits and support the social safety-net, and the poor educational attainment of our youth who do not have adequate skills for the job market and so on. Indeed, there is much that needs to be revamped independent of WTO. Unfortunately, FNM administrations have been particularly reticent in reinforcing the social safety net. In fact, they have not initiated any major social welfare program. This reflects their strong neo-liberal bias [xxi]

It is important that the Minnis administration understand that WTO, like the IMF and the World Bank is part of the Bretton Wood institutions that were created to not only stabilize and promote global capitalism but to reinforce the existing international hierarchy in which developed countries prevail. In other words, these institutions pay lip service to development. The rules of WTO are represented as characterized by a level playing field, but this is pure myth making. The playing field was never level to begin with.  It is hierarchal with developed countries on top, large ‘emerging’ economies in the middle and less/least developed countries at the bottom. Relatively, high income, small island states should not identify with either the developed countries or with the emerging economies. These states have small, vulnerable, dependent economies that will remain dependent due to their size.  In order to join WTO, the Bahamas would have to play on their field, where they have home court advantage and hope for the best. The Bahamas cannot dictate the terms of their ascension.

Various stakeholders regard WTO as a threat to local industry in the Bahamas and have called on elected officials to take a balanced approach to ascension in which local business is not sacrificed to attract foreign investment.[xxii] Local business should not be expected to compete with multinational corporations and other foreign enterprises.

 The Oxford Economics report has outlined an ascension negotiation strategy for the Bahamas. It rightly pointed out that the working party of the ascension process is very unlikely to accept a broad based, economic needs test (ENT) for market entry by global business. Oxford Economics argues that in principle the Bahamas can negotiate to keep the current tariffs rate for about 250 product lines out of 5,000 in manufacturing and agriculture, to protect employment. It further recommended that openness in high level service sectors such as architecture, law and accounting should depend on need. The caveat “in principle” is a subtle way of signaling the distinction between what is possible and the reality of the negotiation process which is not principled. The expectation of local capitalists that the state would protect their interests has been shaken by the standpoint of the Minnis administration, as articulated by Minister Symonette who advocates the comprehensive negotiation strategy.[xxiii]

The economic modelling of Oxford Economics appears partial in favor of the comprehensive WTO approach. In addition to instituting policies that address the institutional weaknesses of our economy, it is prudent to chart the quickest path to economic growth which promotes employment as a survival strategy for a small dependent state.[xxiv] It is important that global businesses that access our economy generate employment. However, this is not the modus operandi of either local or global business.  A growth strategy that emphasizes employment needs to focus on skill development, so that Bahamians can benefit from employment opportunities.

A technology hub should not be conceived as an enclave for foreigners.[xxv] As such it has no potential to become a third pillar of the economy. It is only worthwhile if it generates significant local employment. This sector ought to involve partnerships with local, Bahamian investors and the development of infant industries that are protected from foreign competition. WTO does not allow for such protection. It is grounded on the assumption that nation-states focus on their comparative advantage and import all else. For the Bahamas this is tourism and banking. Although most members are from so-called developing states, WTO is not structured to promote their development. It’s philosophy and rules are predicated on the assumption that member states have mature, developed economies that are fit to compete in a global market.

It is important to recognize that economic growth does not necessarily trickle down. Minister Brent Symonette is still touting the trickledown model that even IMF researchers have discredited. The rising socio-economic inequality within nations locally, regionally and globally forced the IMF to critically reflect on this theory.[xxvi] Within the last decade, the Bahamas has had high unemployment rates that are the result of the impact of the great recession in 2011 that resulted in negative and low growth rates, rising poverty and growing socio-economic inequality.  If the Bahamas is seeking to create higher economic growth, higher productivity and a more equitable society it will need to raise employment and expand the social safety net. This would require higher investments and better outcomes in education and skill training, quality national healthcare and retirement benefits that allow the elderly to have a good quality of life among others. These social supports can encourage workers to have long term stakes in productivity. The existing tax structure cannot support even the minimal social welfare programs that exist; therefore, Bahamians are plagued by rising debt and inadequate social and infrastructural services.[xxvii] The Bahamas needs socio-economic growth with equity. WTO ascension will not change the existing economic model nor does it support equity. Oxford Economics predicts that growth will center on tourism and banking, sectors where we have the greatest advantage, sectors that are already quite globalized. The optimistic speculations of Oxford Economics on growth ought to be contextualized in terms of the predicted economic slowdown of the global economy. This slowdown is not just associated with the business cycle but is part of a longer trend. Hence, we should expect that our economy will continue to be subjected to external shocks, particularly the vicissitude of the US economy and regional tourism. This is evident in the projection of lower GDP rates for the Bahamas over the next several years. Hence, the focus ought to be on surviving global capitalism, that is addressing the aforementioned fundamentals to promote economic growth and socio-economic wellbeing rather than speculating on WTO ascension. [xxviii]

Notes

[i] argumentum ad verecundiam (appeal to reverence or authority).

[ii] This trope is a variant of a trope credited to Elizabeth Warren, “If you don’t have a seat at the table, you’re probably on the menu. Washington works for those who have power. And no one gives up power easily, no one…Nobody’s just going to say ‘women have arrived and let’s just move over'…We have a chance, but we have to fight for it. See Oh, I 2014, ‘Elizabeth Warren: Democratic women need a seat at the governing table’, MotherJones. Available from: https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/09/elizabeth-warren-donors-vote-democratic-women/?fbclid=IwAR1Jq3hb97UHCTOTkZ-akclp2c8ghjEjX9fQRnalzYv_FzZXFk9d59OLO7U

[iii] Z. Laing was the lead negotiator at the start of the ascension process in 2002 and in the current negotiation process in 2018. 

[iv] The case has remained open since 2004 because the parties have not come to a satisfactory compromise on compensation to Antigua and Barbuda.

[v] Thayer gives an interesting discussion of why he believed that the US was likely to win this case and what the strengths and weaknesses of both cases were. Thayer, J, 2004, ‘The trade of cross-border gambling and betting’, Available from:https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1117&context=dltr

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] See the WTO summary of the dispute from 2003-2013. ‘DS285: United States-measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services’, World Trade Organization. Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm

[viii] Drake discusses the right of Antigua to retaliate in a flawed dispute settlement system. She argued that the US has had to pay twice, firstly by amending its domestic policy such that it is in line with WTO’s interpretation of US’ GATT commitments and by offering compensation to the affected members. The USA still faces an open-ended retaliation by Antigua who did not agree to the US’ offer. Drake E, Available from:  http://www.stewartlaw.com/article/ViewArticle/846

[ix] See excepts from Sir R. Sanders’ press statement in 2017 about the losses to the Antigua’s economy amounting to over $200 million and the fact that they have not taken retaliatory action. ‘Antigua-Barbuda: Not letting the US off the hook’ Caribbean News Now. Available from: https://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/2017/09/29/antigua-barbuda-not-letting-us-off-hook-wto-case/

[x] See Anderson on the problematic of determining the economic welfare implications of the dispute settlement body. Anderson, K, 2014, ‘Contributions of GATT/WTO to global economic welfare: empirical evidence’ Journal of Economic Surveys. Available from: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/joes.12087

[xi]  See Von Tigerstrom (2005) for a discussion of the special vulnerabilities of small island developing states.  Von Tigerstrom, B, 2005, ‘Small island developing states and international trade: special challenges in the global partnership for development’ Melbourne Journal of International Law, vol 6, no. 2, Available from: https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1681172/Tigerstrom.pdf

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] See Tang, M and Wei, S, 2008, ‘The value of making commitments externally: evidence from WTO ascension’ The National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper no, 14582. Available from: https://www.nber.org/papers/w14582. Also see Bernier, A. and Schlandt, J, 2018, ‘Literature review: WTO ascension and economic growth’. Available from: https://tcb.usaid.gov/prepared/literature_review_wto_accession_and_economic_growth.pdf.  See Durlauf, S. N., Johnson, P., and Jonathan, R. & Temple, W. 2005, ‘Growth Econometrics’. In Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. N., & Elsevier B.V. (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth, Volume 1A. Available from: https://www.sciencedirect.com/handbook/handbook-of-economic-growth/vol/1/part/PA  and V. Chemutai and H. Escaith. 2017, “An Empirical Assessment of the Economic Effects of WTO Accession and its Commitments’ Available from: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201705_e.pdf for discussions of the challenges and limitations of econometric models.

[xiv] See Oxford Economics, 2019, The Bahamas: WTO Impact Assessment, pp.1, 8-10. Available from: https://www.bahamastradeinfo.gov.bs/the-bahamas-wto-impact-assessment/ for a  report on the limited and comprehensive ascension profiles and its rationale for the comprehensive model. 

[xv] Ibid (2019, P. 97) for a discussion of the distinction between the two forms of tariff. Also note their estimated 15% cost savings associated with the implementation of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).

[xvi]  Ibid (2019) Oxford Economics recommends the basic entry level Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) tariff of 15%, keeping certain product lines outside liberalization.

[xvii] See Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Measures Report-The Bahamas-Mutual Evaluation Report (2017). Available from:  https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/cfatf-4meval-bahamas.pdf for the ALC/CFT measures the Bahamas has undertaken. Also see Sealy, T, 2019, ‘Eu lists Bahamas as having weak anti-money laundering, terrorist financing regimes’ Eyewitness News. Available from: https://ewnews.com/eu-lists-bahamas-as-having-weak-anti-money-laundering-terrorist-financing-regimes for a discussion of the February 2019 European Union College of Commissioners’ listing of the Bahamas as a high risk country for ALC/CFT.   

[xviii] For a discussion of the fair competition bill, market access and the impact on local businesses see Hartnell, N, 2018, ‘Shooting in the dark over Wto’s impacts ’ Tribune242. Available from: http://www.tribune242.com/news/2018/jul/24/shooting-in-the-dark-over-wtos-impacts/ Also see The Bahamas Fair Competition Act 2018: Layman’s Version. https://www.bahamastradeinfo.gov.bs/cms/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/The-Bahamas.Competition-Act-LayManDraft-2018.StandaloneAgency.pdf

 See the reporting of Minister B. Symonette’s commentary on the purpose of the BH1B and BH4S Visa for a principle employee and spouse/offspring. Russell, K, 2019, ‘Symonette: Act will boost our economy’ Tribune242. Available from: http://www.tribune242.com/news/2019/apr/25/symonette-act-will-boost-our-economy/

[xix] See BTC history and privatization in 2011. ‘BTC History 1879-2014’ Available from: https://files.btcbahamas.com/2016/06/07/btc-history-1879-2014-1.pdf. Also, note the downsizing exercise in 2010. ‘ZNS workers terminated’ The Nassau Guardian. Available from: https://thenassauguardian.com/2010/12/31/zns-workers-terminated/ and M. Moss’, chairman of the Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas commentary about the need for downsizing. Moss, M, R 2012, ‘Defending ZNS’ The Nassau Guardian. Available from: https://thenassauguardian.com/2012/03/26/defending-zns/

[xx] See A Closer Look, ZNS, 2019, ‘The honorable Brent Symonette pt.2’. Youtube Video. Available from: https://www.fiweh.com/05/16/2019/a-closer-look-the-hon-brent-symonette-pt-2#.XPRpVxZKjIU

[xxi] See the IMF Country reports for the Bahamas over the last few years for an overview of the economy from a neo-liberal standpoint. International Monetary Fund 2018, The Bahamas:2018 article iv consultation-press release and staff report. Available from: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/05/14/The-Bahamas-2018-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-45874 and International Monetary Fund 2016, The Bahamas:2016 article iv consultation-press release and staff report. Available from: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Bahamas-2016-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-44074.  See ‘The Bahamas: unemployment from 2007-2017, Statista. Available from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/578549/unemployment-rate-in-the-bahamas/ See ‘The Bahamas: national debt in relation to Gross Domestic Product from 2014-2024, Statista. Available from https://www.statista.com/statistics/578572/national-debt-of-the-bahamas-in-relation-to-gross-domestic-product-gdp/  Also see Central Bank Governor John Rolle 2018, ‘The Foreign Exchange Constraint on Monetary Policy: The Bahamian Context’ presented to the Government and Policy Institute, The University of the Bahamas. Available from:  https://www.centralbankbahamas.com/download/088857300.pdf. See Archer, I ‘Analysis of the implementation and macroeconomic effect of the value added tax type in the Bahamas’. Available from: https://www.academia.edu/26540330/ANALYSIS_OF_THE_IMPLEMENTATION_AND_MACROECONOMIC_EFFECT_OF_VALUE_ADDED_TAX_TYPE_IN_THE_BAHAMAS. Also see Schlotterbeck, S, 2017, ‘Tax Administration Reform in the Caribbean, Challenges, Achievements and Next Steps’. IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund. Available  from: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/04/04/Tax-Administration-Reforms-in-the-Caribbean-Challenges-Achievements-and-Next-Steps-44800. See Fred Smith’s commentary in support of progressive taxation. Hartnell, N, 2018, ‘QC backs income tax to ease the rich/poor divide. Tribune 242.  http://www.tribune242.com/news/2018/apr/03/qc-backs-income-taxes-ease-richpoor-divide/

[xxii] See Bob Meyers, spokesperson for the Organization for Responsible Governance talk about the fact that Bahamian businesses are not ready for international competition. Hartnell, N, 2018, ‘Wto: Bahamas has too much baggage unless government acts’ Tribune242. Available from: http://www.tribune242.com/news/2018/jan/18/wto-bahamas-has-too-much-baggage-unless/ The Bahamas Light Industries Development Council takes issue with Oxford Economics’ assessment of the impact of WTO. It disagrees with higher bond rates, agrees with protective tariffs for the sector, charges Oxford Economics with the underestimation of workers in the sector and points out that future industries cannot be protected under WTO. ‘May 8th 2019-BLIDC response to Oxford Economics WTO impact assessment report’ News/Updates. Available from: http://blidc.org/newsupdates/

[xxiii] Oxford Economics (2019, P. 144). See Minister B. Bent Symonette on WTO. He supports the comprehensive model and negotiation strategy advocated by Oxford Economics. He feels that the Bahamas can compete with foreign businesses. A Closer Look, ZNS, 2019, ‘The honorable Brent Symonette pt.2’. Youtube Video. Available from: https://www.fiweh.com/05/16/2019/a-closer-look-the-hon-brent-symonette-pt-2#.XPRpVxZKjIU

[xxiv] See Rodrik’s discussion of state intervention and the growth path of China and the Asian tigers and the relationship of economic growth to employment. Rodrik, D, 2014, ‘The past, present, and future of economic growth’, Challenge, 57:3, 5-39. Available from: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.2753/0577-5132570301

[xxv] See the commentary of the Minister of state for Grand Bahama, Kasi Thompson on the vision for the technology hub. The Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute would need to be upgraded to at least grant BS degrees in the STEM fields. http://www.bahamas.gov.bs/wps/portal/public/gov/government/news/

[xxvi] See Minister Symonette’s advocacy of trickledown economics in his discussion of the commercial enterprise bill.  Travis Cartwright Carroll “New Bill to have Trickledown Effects” https://thenassauguardian.com/2017/11/24/new-bill-trickle-effects/. See IMF Staff Discussion Note (2015) E. Dabla-Norris et a 2015. Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global Perspective. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1513.pdf For profiles of inequality in the Bahamas and the Caribbean see the Human Development Report Data Base http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BHS and the World Inequality Database for national income. https://wid.world/country/bahamas/.  Also see ECLA (2018) Caribbean Outlook for a discussion of inequality, poverty and gender in the Caribbean. It shows significant inequality in the Bahamas in relation to the region. https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/43581/4/S1800607_en.pdf

[xxvii] See the World Bank. World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work. http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2019 for a discussion of the importance of a strong social safety for developing countries.

[xxviii] For a discussion of a long-term economic slowdown see D. Rodrik (2014, P. 33). The IMF predicts slowdowns in the short and medium term in various regions of the world including the Caribbean. The prediction for the Caribbean is negative growth rates. See International Monetary Fund, ‘World economic outlook reports: world economic outlook, April 2019 growth slowdown, precarious recovery. Available from: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/03/28/world-economic-outlook-april-2019#Chapter%201. See GDP growth rate from 1961-2017. World Bank Group ‘World Bank national accounts data, and the OECD National Accounts data files’ The World Bank. Available from:  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2017&locations=BS&start=1961 Also see declining real GDP growth projections for the Bahamas 2019-2024. ‘The Bahamas: growth rate of the real gross domestic product from 2014-2024’ Statista https://www.statista.com/statistics/578507/gross-domestic-product-gdp-growth-rate-in-the-bahamas/